The present study examines a series of performance measures as an attempt to resolve the ex post veri…cation problem. These meas- 
Introduction
The mutual fund industry has experienced a dramatic growth on a global basis during the last two decades. Mutual funds are now the preferred investment vehicle for individuals. Their outstanding success is due to the fact that they provide access to professional management and a highly diversi…ed portfolio even for investors with low initial capital. In a world of perfect competition and symmetric information, investing in actively managed mutual funds is Pareto e¢ cient from a welfare point of view.
However, given the delegated nature of active fund management, a series of problems related to asymmetric information may occur. Asymmetric information between the mutual fund shareholder and the manager can arise in three stages (see Spencer, 2000 , for an analytical discussion of asymmetric information issues in …nancial markets). Firstly, there is the possibility of adverse selection. The most capable managers are more likely to get employed in di¤erent types of investment vehicles, where the compensation structure is more directly linked to their performance. Closed-end funds, hedge funds and private banking services could attract the best managers. Secondly, there is a moral hazard problem. Once investment has taken place, the manager could attempt to expropriate wealth from the investors, most commonly by charging a high expense ratio. Thirdly, there is the issue of ex post veri…cation, i.e. of fairly evaluating the investment outcome. For this purpose, researchers have suggested various performance measures, according to which managers should be classi…ed and rewarded.
The problems arising from asymmetric information are even more severe in small and emerging markets with oligopolistic fund industries and vertically integrated …nancial systems. In such markets, managers are more likely to obtain insider information which they can exploit in their own interest. Furthermore, high expense ratios are often observed, given the lack of transparency and competition between fund companies. The insu¢ cient regulatory framework and …nancial knowledge of investors, common features of emerging markets, make fund management screening and evaluation an even more di¢ cult task in this case.
Various performance measures have been suggested in the literature. In order to take into account underlying risk factors, mutual funds are classi…ed as Winners (W) or Losers (L) using one of the following criteria: raw returns, the Sharpe (1966) ratio, Jensen (1968) 's alpha, its augmented version suggested by Elton et al. (1996) and Gruber (1996) , Carhart (1997) 's alpha, and its augmented version to take into account bond returns.
The most common measures are the Sharpe ratio and Jensen's alpha. The former adjusts returns using their variance, as in the mean-variance world of Markowitz (1952) . Such a measure, however, creates an obvious incentive to undertake higher moments risks. This is common practice among hedge fund and bond fund managers in emerging markets. Since these risks are priced in …nancial markets (see Harvey and Siddique, 2000) , they should be taken into account when evaluating managers. As for Jensen's alpha, this is rooted in the CAPM tradition. The CAPM is, in principle, a static representation of capital markets, which ignores their dynamic component. Therefore, it is an incomplete framework in the presence of stochastically evolving risk factors (see Merton, 1973) . In fact, Size and Value strategies could yield positive returns without any CAPM beta exposure (see French, 1993, 1996) , and the same applies to momentum strategies (see Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) .
The empirical evidence showing that these strategies systematically outperform alternative ones is puzzling 1 . Concluding that there is no risk factor underlying these strategies is equivalent to admitting "free lunches", in the spirit of Harrison and Kreps (1979) . However, it has been suggested by Carhart (1997) that the Fama-French and momentum portfolios re ‡ect speci…c risk factors and should be taken into account. In fact, Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) show that the Fama-French anomalies can be resolved in an intertemporal setting, while Petkova (2006) argues that these portfolios are correlated with shocks to a series of …nancial variables. Employing multi-factor rather than single-factor measures might be a way to shed more light on this issue. However, whilst most recent studies testing for performance persistence in the US fund industry use multi-factor measures à la Carhart 2 , few studies employ such measures in an international setting 3 and in the case of emerging markets. The present study contributes to this area of the literature by focusing on Greek domestic equity mutual funds during the period 1998-2004 and using such an approach, which adjusts for risk factors, thereby providing some new unbiased evidence for an additional market 4 . The case of Greece is particularly interesting to examine because the mutual fund industry is oligopolistic, and the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) is relatively small in total capitalization and characterized by illiquidity. Moreover, the market is dominated by a few large size companies and some key market players. However, Greece is an emerging market quickly turning into a developed one, as a result of EMU membership and full integration in the international …nancial system. This is evident from the signi…cant increase in the participation of foreign investors over the period analysed here (see Figure 2 ). Such institutional characteristics and the participation of foreign investors in the …nancial system might be important factors for fund performance and market e¢ ciency also in other small or emerging markets. Our dataset being su¢ ciently long and comprehensive, it can capture the dynamic evolution of the industry, enabling us to evalu- ate mutual funds under di¤erent market conditions without the problem of survivorship bias.
Previewing our results, we …nd evidence for persistence over one-year horizons during the period 1998-2001. After 2001, persistence becomes very weak or disappears, depending on the employed performance measure. As we adjust for risk factors using more sophisticated measures and reducing the bias, the evidence for persistence becomes weaker. The most appropriate measure appears to be the augmented version of the Carhart one, which includes a bond index (often neglected, but extremely important, since equity funds use bonds to reduce their market risk exposure in periods of negative market returns -see Figure 3 ). The integration of the Greek market in the international …nancial system and the direction of ‡ows to past winners are the two factors most likely to account for the lack of persistence after 2001. The increasing participation of foreign investors increases market e¢ ciency, reducing the informational advantages of domestic fund managers. Furthermore, relatively high ‡ows to past winners possibly generate a "dilution" e¤ect, making it impossible for managers persistently to outperform others. As for the ex post veri…cation problem, our …ndings imply that once excess returns are correctly decomposed and risk factors are taken into account, fund managers do not persistently add any extra value to their portfolios after 2001.
The layout of the paper is the following. Section 2 reviews the existing literature for the US and international markets. The main features of the Greek …nancial system and fund industry are brie ‡y discussed in Section 3. Section 4 provides data sources and de…nitions and reviews various performance measures to test the persistence hypothesis. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence, whilst Section 6 contains concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
Literature Review
The literature on performance persistence is vast. Most studies have focused on the US market, but more recently there has been a growing interest in international markets. Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968) in their seminal papers introduced early measures of persistence. While Sharpe (1966) reported a signi…cant relationship between the present and the past performance of mutual funds over 10-year horizons, Jensen (1968) concluded that future performance is not predictable. Carlson (1970) , using risk-adjusted returns, found no evidence of persistence over 10-year horizons, and weak evidence for 5-year horizons.
Subsequently, Lehmann and Modest (1987) also reported evidence of persistence for US equity funds. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) argued that abnormal returns are not signi…cant once transaction costs and management fees are calculated. However, Brown et al. (1992) suggested that the results of previous studies may have been spurious because of survivorship bias, and that therefore the reported persistence could be explained by the fact that only successful funds survive through time. Hendricks et al. (1993) and Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) argued that persistence is a short-lived phenomenon, while negative persistence was found even over longer horizons. Kahn and Rudd (1995) extended these results to bond funds. Malkiel (1995) provided evidence of lack of persistence in the 1980s, while Brown and Goetzmann (1995) reported persistence for short horizons taking into account the survivorship bias e¤ect. Gruber (1996) examined whether raw and risk-adjusted returns can be predicted using performance measures, and showed that Jensen's alpha works better for the former.
Phelps and Detzel (1997) drew the distinction between macropersistence and micropersistence, the former being due to the persistence of a broad equity class, the latter to persistence in managerial ability. The study of Carhart (1997) had a signi…cant impact on the literature, introducing a new measure of performance which adjusts for risk factors. Using this new meas-ure, he reported no overall persistence, only underperforming funds exhibiting some degree of persistence. Droms and Walker (2001) found no evidence of persistence over long-horizons, while Bollen and Busse (2005) suggested that persistence is by its nature a short-term phenomenon, to be found over short-term horizons such as quarterly periods.
Studies on markets other than the US one include some on the UK mutual fund industry. Examples are those of Blake and Timmermann (1998) Christensen (2005) found no predictive ability of past performance measures in the case of Denmark. Finally, Otten and Bams (2002) found no persistence in equity funds from the largest European markets, apart from the case of the UK. Table 1 summarises the …ndings from the aforementioned studies.
T able 1 3 The case of Greece
The Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) was founded in 1876. Since 1991 the Capital Markets Commission has been the superintendent authority for all capital markets. The mutual fund industry was established in 1972 with the introduction of one equity and one hybrid fund. Since 1989, following institutional changes to the Greek capital market, the fund industry experienced rapid growth. While in 1985 there were only two state-controlled funds managing 4 billion drachmas, by December 2004 there existed 28 fund companies o¤ering 262 funds of all types, 68 of which were domestic equity funds, and managing more than 31.65 billion Euros (an equivalent of 10.7 trillion drachmas). Figure 1 shows the number of domestic equity funds as well as the ASE General Index. Table 2 presents statistics on the equity fund industry and average returns of the funds compared with the returns on the ASE General Index. The extraordinary demand for equity fund investments in 1999 resulted in the average fund size increasing to 266 mil. Euros, up from only 40 mil. Euros the previous year. The supply side responded to demand during the following years, with the number of funds on o¤er more than doubling. Average returns of the funds are similar to the ASE General Index returns with the exception of 1998-1999, when small cap strategies yielded higher returns than the General Index, and of 2004, when the ASE General Index high returns were mainly due to large cap stocks. The Greek …nancial system is oligopolistic and vertically integrated, dominated by the three largest banks, namely the National Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank and Eurobank. Their capitalization represents 24.44% of total ASE capitalisation as of December 2004, while they also hold a signi…cant portion of the other listed companies, either directly or indirectly through their mutual fund companies. This means that they are key market players and are able to in ‡uence corporate decisions as shareholders. Furthermore, they play a signi…cant role in short-and long-term corporate …nancing, being able to approve or reject business plans and monitor their implementation. This is another source of insider information about business prospects. Moreover, almost all IPOs have been underwritten by one or more of these banks. Even though the banks as underwriters cannot participate in the IPO directly, this is possible through their fund management companies. It is also important to note that these banking groups incorporate brokerage companies, which carry out transactions for them and their clients, being market makers too. Finally, these banks control the main fund management companies of the domestic industry, holding 55.93% of the total assets under management in December 2001, when their market share of domestic equity funds was as high as 49.41%.
Therefore, it is clear that these banks play the multiple role of stockholder, lender, underwriter and investor in the …nancial system, which allows them to access valuable information for investment purposes. This access to higher quality and costless information gives the funds o¤ered by these banking groups with a signi…cant advantage over other mutual funds. Such a market structure makes it possible to exploit insider or private information, inconsistently with market e¢ ciency, even in its strong form, and increases the informational asymmetry between fund shareholders and managers. Furthermore, the trading activity of these fund companies has not only a direct impact on prices, but, more importantly, an indirect one through a signalling e¤ect to the other market participants. 5 Under these circumstances, it would not be surprising if speci…c funds persistently outperformed their peers, making the case of Greece a particularly interesting one to analyse.
Data and Methodology

Data
All domestic equity funds with data available for two consecutive years have been included, and therefore the dataset is free of survivorship bias. It spans the period from 01/01/1998 to 31/12/2004. We use the Net Asset Value (NAV) of the domestic equity funds, the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) returns as proxied by the General Index returns, the MSCI Government Bond Index and the risk-free rate as proxied by the 3-month Government ZeroCoupons. The source for the funds NAVs and Net Flows is the Association of the Greek Institutional Investors (AGII), while the other series were obtained from Datastream. Returns are calculated on a weekly basis. Data for the participation of foreign investors in the ASE were provided by the Central Depository of ASE, while the data for bond holdings were collected by hand from the funds'reports. We follow Otten and Bams (2002) in constructing the strategy-mimicking portfolios. All stocks included in the ASE General Index were utilized. Ranking stocks with respect to the previous year's size, we assign the top 30% by market capitalization to the Big size portfolio and the bottom 30% to the Small size portfolio. The di¤erence between returns to these two portfolios yields the size strategy (SMB) return. Ranking stocks according to last year's returns, the di¤erence between the top 30% winners by market capitalization and the bottom 30% losers provides the momentum (MOM) portfolio return. Moreover, the 30% of stocks with the highest book-to-market-value ratio were assigned to the High Value portfolio, and the 30% of stocks with the lowest ratio to the Low Value portfolio. The di¤erence between their respective returns yields the book-to-market value (HML) strategy returns. All returns were calculated on a weekly basis and the portfolios were annually rebalanced. 6 6 We have also used other similar percentages as cuto¤ points for constructing the
Performance measures
Raw returns of the mutual funds were calculated using the standard formula:
These are employed as our …rst performance measure. Next we use the Sharpe ratio, which measures fund excess returns adjusted for their riskiness; it is given by the ratio:
where R f is the risk-free rate and p is the standard deviation of the fund returns.
Jensen's alpha measures the ability of the mutual fund manager to add value over and above the return which would be justi…ed by the systematic risk of his portfolio. Formally, this is given by the intercept Jensen of the regression of the fund excess returns on the market index excess returns:
where R m is the stock market return. The intercept of this single-factor model has also been used to infer the "stock picking" ability or "selectivity" of the manager. This model can be augmented to include returns on government bonds. It should be noted that domestic equity funds invest a portion of their assets in government bonds, in order to reduce their stock market exposure when managers have a negative view for prospective returns, and to earn a higher interest rate for their nonstock holdings. A domestic equity fund has the obligation to invest at least 65% of its total assets in ASE stocks according to the Greek mutual funds legislation. As a result, non-stock holdings can be signi…cantly high. Since strategies portfolios -the results were almost identical and are available from the authors upon request. a performance measure estimates the value a manager adds to his portfolio over and above the returns justi…ed by known risk factors, Elton et al. (1996) and Gruber (1996) suggest that the excess bond return should be included in order to allow for fund returns from bond holdings. Hence, the augmented model is given by:
Moving on to multi-factor models, the three-factor model of Fama and French (1996) employed here is the following:
The intercept of this regression is interpreted as a performance measure. Following this approach, we are able to capture excess returns generated by tactical asset allocation strategies exploiting the inconsistencies of the CAPM. More speci…cally, excess fund returns are decomposed into excess market returns, returns generated by buying small size stocks and selling big size stocks (Small Minus Big-SMB), and returns generated by buying stocks with high book-to-market ratios and selling stocks with low book-to-market ratios (High Minus Low-HML). The intercept of this regression represents the value the manager has added to his portfolio over and above what could be justi…ed by market risk and generated by these known strategies.
One step further, we use the Carhart (1997) measure, which builds on the Fama and French model but also captures returns generated by the momentum e¤ect as analyzed in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . This strategy (MOM) implies buying and selling stocks with high and low past year's returns respectively.
The four-factor model is given by:
The intercept of this regression-Carhart -can be used as a performance measure and it takes into account not only market risk but also excess returns generated by these well-documented strategies.
Lastly, the four-factor model is augmented to include the bond index return. We would argue that the intercept of this regression-AC -is the most appropriate performance measure to solve the ex post veri…cation problem, since it also includes bond returns, which, as already mentioned, are used e¤ectively by managers to reduce market risk exposure in a bear market:
Non-parametric tests
In order to test the persistence hypothesis, contingency tables for each of the measures presented above are constructed and a series of non-parametric tests are carried out. These are the Z-test proposed by Malkiel (1995) , the cross-product ratio test of Brown and Goetzmann (1995) , and the chi-squared test of Kahn and Rudd (1995) . To construct these test statistics, we classify the mutual funds as winners (W) or losers (L) depending on whether their performance measure was above or below the median value for each time period.
As we only have estimates of performance, instead of ranking funds using only the point estimates, we also take into account whether these are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Therefore, we …rstly rank the funds with positive and signi…cant estimates, then those with measures not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, and …nally those with negative and signi…cant estimates. Clearly, ranking as a top winner (loser) a fund with a high (low), but insigni…cantly di¤erent than zero, point estimate of its performance measure would generate spurious results.
The null hypothesis for these three non-parametric tests is that of no persistence. In the Malkiel (1995) test, no persistence means that a past winner will be either winner or loser next period with equal probability p = 0:5. The test statistic is calculated as follows:
and it follows a standard normal distribution.
In the test of Brown and Goetzmann (1995) the null hypothesis is that the number of funds changing category next period is equal to the number of funds remaining in the same category. The hypothesis is tested using the cross-product ratio (CPR):
Values of the statistic greater than unity indicate persistence, while values smaller than unity indicate reversal. For the statistical signi…cance of the test values, the following Z-test is constructed:
where
Finally, Kahn and Rudd (1995) use a chi-square test, which compares the observed with the expected frequency of an event. In the case of no persistence, the expected number of winners remaining winners is equal to the expected number of winners turning losers, as well as the number of losers remaining losers and the number of losers becoming winners. Cortez et al. (1999) specify this chi-square statistic as:
which follows a chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom.
Empirical Results
This section presents the results of the non-parametric tests for the performance measures discussed in the previous section. The persistence hypothesis is tested on an annual basis in all cases.
Raw returns
The …rst measure used is raw returns. The classi…cation of the funds across time and the statistics of the non-parametric tests are given in Table 3 . There is signi…cant evidence of persistence in 3 out of the 6 examined periods (1998-99, 2000-01, 2003-04). Throughout, past winners have signi…cantly higher probability (57%) to remain winners than to turn losers next period. Such persistence could be mainly explained by the investment strategy of the funds. Since raw returns are not adjusted for risk, equity funds which invest in highly volatile stocks are more likely to be characterized as winners in periods with positive market returns and as losers in periods with negative market returns. Therefore, persistence is observed more often in years with the same sign for market returns. On the other hand, when the stock market trend is reversed, as in the period 2002-2003, past winners are more likely to become losers (only 41% of the past winners remained winners in this period). Clearly, such a performance measure is ine¢ cient and it can lead to spurious results, since persistence is due mainly to market returns, rather than managerial ability.
T able 3
Sharpe Ratio
By contrast, the Sharpe ratio adjusts funds returns for risk using their standard deviation, thereby taking into account the volatility of the investment strategy. Table 4 reports the results for the persistence hypothesis using this measure. Signi…cant persistence is observed, mainly during the same three periods as in the case of raw returns. Interestingly, overall persistence is even more signi…cant, as 59% of past winners are classi…ed as winners in the following year too. The persistence reported here is due to the fact that a number of funds managed to achieve high excess returns without undertaking higher volatility risk. Hence, some classes of stocks had higher returns than other classes with the same volatility. The funds which invested in these classes of stocks managed to achieve persistently higher Sharpe ratios.
T able 4
Jensen' s measure
The next measures used are Jensen's alpha (regression 3) and the intercept of the augmented market model (regression 4). Table 5 and Table 6 report the results for these measures. When using Jensen's alpha we …nd evidence of persistence in 2000-2001 as well as in [2003] [2004] , while the augmented model implies that persistence in these periods is not statistically signi…c-ant. Compared to the results obtained using the Sharpe ratio, persistence is now marginally lower, re ‡ecting the di¤erence between systematic risk as measured in the market model and fund riskiness as captured by the Sharpe ratio. Throughout the periods analysed, past winners (losers) are still more likely to remain winners (losers), but the augmented model reduces persistence further. As Elton et al. (1996) and Gruber (1996) have suggested, an appropriate performance measure should adjust for bond returns, since equity funds are allowed to invest a signi…cant portion of their non-stock holdings in short-or long-term bonds. As Figure 3 shows, managers signi…cantly increased their bond holdings during the bear market of 2000-2003. This strategy was reversed in 2003, when stock prices started to rise again. Hence, it can be argued that investment in assets other than equity is the outcome of a deliberate strategy and, therefore, one should account for the corresponding returns.
The superiority of the augmented model can be illustrated through an example. The stock market faced signi…cant negative returns in the period 2000-2001. Some equity funds shifted part of their assets to bonds. The single-factor model may result in a biased fund beta and attribute bond returns to Jensen's alpha, leading to the classi…cation of such a fund as a winner. This is the reason why we …nd persistence in this period (see Table  5 ). On the other hand, the augmented model correctly assigns these returns to the exposure to the risk associated with bond returns. As a result, no signi…cant persistence is now observed during this period (see Table 6 ): as one correctly adjusts for risk, the evidence for persistence weakens. Returns, which were previously characterized as abnormal, are now explained in term of known risk factors.
T able 5
T able 6
Fama-French and Carhart measures
Next we use the Fama-French model (see regression 5) to adjust for known sources of risk. As already explained in Section 3, this regression incorporates portfolio strategies, which exploit the size and book-to-market anomalies documented in French (1993, 1996) . Using this regression, we adjust for returns generated by strategies which invest in small and value stocks. This is quite important because the ASE General Index is highly dependent on a few large capitalization stocks. Therefore, for periods during which the returns of small size stocks signi…cantly exceed the returns of the large capitalization stocks, the single-factor model will assign these excess returns to positive performance. Hence, funds which follow small cap strategies will appear to have positive or negative performance, which persists through time, even though this is solely due to the investment strategy. Table 7 reports the results for persistence using as a performance measure the intercept of regression (5) . There is signi…cant evidence of persistence during the period 2000-2001, and only weak evidence during 1998-1999.
T able 7
We augment the Fama and French regression adding the momentum strategy returns. The intercept of regression (6) is Carhart's alpha. ASE returns exhibit signi…cant serial correlation, especially during pronounced upward or downward movements. This is a well known characteristic, and fund managers are expected to employ tactical asset allocation schemes to capture momentum. In a small market with oligopolistic mutual fund industry, momentum strategies may be even more important, since fund managers tend to mimic each other. 7 Therefore, "hot stocks"are highly attractive for managers who fear they might miss an upward trend. Table 8 presents the results of the tests for persistence using Carhart's alpha as a performance measure. Evidence for signi…cant persistence is found only during 2000-2001. Persistence is also detected during 1998-1999, but this is not statistically signi…cant given the small number of funds (27) examined in this period. The estimates of persistence are marginally lower than those based on the previous measures. It is worth highlighting that, as can be seen from Table 8 , persistence is found only in the …rst part of the sample (1998-2001), while after 2001 there is almost no evidence for it.
T able 8
As previously argued, the intercept of regression 7 can be considered the most appropriate performance measure to solve the ex post veri…cation problem. This is because it captures most of the strategies documented in the literature for tactical asset allocation as well as the exposure to bond returns risk. Therefore, it provides a measure of genuine added value, net of returns attributed to known risk factors. Table 9 reports the results.
T able 9
These are quite interesting, since persistence is signi…cantly lower. Overall persistence is statistically insigni…cant, while, after 2001, funds are more likely to change classi…cation from year to year than to remain winners or losers. Weak evidence for persistence is found for 1998-1999, while signi…cant persistence is documented in 2000-2001. However, this is weaker compared to the estimates based on the Carhart measure or the previous measures.
Discussion
The results presented above lead to some striking conclusions for the Greek mutual fund industry. Firstly, if known risk factors and documented portfolio strategies are taken into account, performance persistence almost disappears, even over short horizons, as the 1-year periods employed here. This suggests that evidence for performance persistence could be due to the failure to adjust for these factors. In particular, bond returns and momentum strategies seem to be two factors which, if omitted, can yield spurious persistence results.
Secondly, evidence of persistence is found only in the …rst half of the examined period. No persistence is documented after 2001. This is quite an interesting result considering the fact that the number of funds more than doubled over the three years from 1998 to 2001 (see Figure 1) . On the one hand, it could be expected that old funds, which experienced the bear market, would be handicapped after 1999 relative to new ones entering the market. The reasons would be the massive out ‡ows that past losers faced and the inability to get rid of badly performing stocks. On the other hand, old funds could be expected to perform better, exploiting the better quality of market research and the higher ability of their more experienced managers. It seems that these two e¤ects, working in opposite directions in a rapidly changing market, resulted in no persistence.
To account for the lack of persistence after 2001, the role of foreign investors as well as the behaviour of the ‡ows should also be considered. The Greek stock market started being classi…ed as a mature market in 2000-2001, which coincides with the entry of the country into the EMU. Signi…cant regulatory improvements took place during the 1998-1999 period of sharp price increases and the subsequent prolonged period of negative returns (2000) (2001) (2002) . The new environment enabled the share of foreign investors to rise signi…cantly after 2001, "crowding out" noise traders (see Figure 2 ). More precisely, while foreign investors held only 21.62% of the total ASE capitalization in May 2001, this share had increased to 38.45% by December 2004. The integration of the market in the international …nancial system and the more transparent regulatory framework would be inconsistent with persistently higher abnormal returns earned by domestic equity funds. It is likely that fund managers were able to add value to their portfolios, before 2001, by exploiting noise traders'ine¢ cient investment strategies, and that the replacement of the noise traders with more sophisticated foreign investors after 2001 played a signi…cant role in reducing domestic funds'abnormal returns and their persistence.
The behaviour of ‡ows is another important factor when investigating performance persistence in open-end funds. Managers have to adjust investment decisions to the size and the timing of the ‡ows in and out of funds. A simple way to examine the direction of ‡ows is to classify funds according to speci…c performance measures at the end of each year, and to calculate the total ‡ows to each fund during the following 6 months 8 . Table 10 compares the average ‡ow to the top 5 funds with the average ‡ow to the bottom 5 classi…ed according to raw returns, the Sharpe Ratio, and the augmented Carhart measure respectively, from 1998 to 2003. In general, ‡ows are towards past winners, classi…ed as such on the basis of raw returns and the augmented Carhart measure, for most of the years, while the classi…cation according to the Sharpe Ratio yields mixed results.
T able 10
Linking this evidence to the lack of persistence, one can argue that the direction of ‡ows to past winners plays a partial, yet signi…cant, role in preventing them from being top performers again. Being obliged to invest a signi…cant amount (owing to the new ‡ows) in a relatively short horizon, managers cannot be as successful as with their initial investment strategy. Hence, there is a "dilution" e¤ect such that managers cannot consistently outperform others (see Greene and Hodges, 2002 , and Berk and Greene, 2004, for a related discussion).
Finally, it should be noted that we do not …nd any asymmetry in performance persistence, which is contrary to US studies documenting that overall persistence is mainly due to negative persistence (see, e.g., Goetzmann, 1995 and Carhart, 1997) . This …nding essentially implies that managers with bad skills do not outnumber those with good skills.
Conclusions
This study has analysed performance persistence in domestic equity funds in the Greek market, during a period characterized by di¤erent market phases, a remarkable increase in the number of mutual funds and the integration of the market in the international …nancial system. A series of performance measures suggested in the literature have been used, after discussing their assumptions and implications. The results show that, when adjusting for known risk factors and portfolio strategies, the evidence for persistence gradually weakens. Using an appropriate performance measure to test the persistence hypothesis (speci…cally, the augmented Carhart measure including bond returns) is crucial to solve the ex post veri…cation problem. Unless risk factors are taken into account, the results might be spurious, making the problems arising from asymmetric information even more severe.
Performance persistence has been found in the …rst half of our sample, while there is no such evidence after 2001. The integration in the international …nancial system with the associated signi…cant increase in the number of foreign institutional investors during this period, and the "dilution"e¤ect generated by the direction of ‡ows to past winners might account for the lack of persistence after 2001. Regulatory improvements and a more competitive fund industry also made the market more e¢ cient. Moreover, no signi…cant di¤erence between positive and negative persistence has been documented. This might be due to the remarkable growth of the fund industry during the period under examination.
These …ndings could be relevant also for other emerging markets with oligopolistic and vertically integrated …nancial industries, which are in the process of becoming more integrated internationally. Increased international competition and the use of appropriate performance measures might increase market e¢ ciency and reduce informational asymmetries, resulting in a lower degree of persistence. Regarding future research, it would be interesting to examine the persistence hypothesis for foreign funds investing in Greece, when appropriate data become available. This would shed further light on the equilibrating mechanism which has eliminated persistence after 2001. Note: The EW Return is the annual arithmetic mean return of the funds, while the VW Return indicates the average return using weighted by the size of each fund. The ASE Return is the annual return of the ASE General Index. 
Appendix
